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Brette criticizes the notion of neural coding as used in neuroscience as a way to 
clarify the causal structure of the brain. This criticism will be positioned in a 
wider range of findings and ideas from other branches of neuroscience and 
biology. While supporting Brette’s critique, they also suggest the need for more 
radical changes in neuroscience than Brette envisions. 
 
 
Brette’s analysis and critique of neural coding provides an important challenge for neuroscience. 
He shows how neuroscience’s reliance on neural coding brings in an external scientist’s 
perspective that searches for correlations – encodings – between environmental features that are 
recognizable by us and neural events made recognizable for us through psychophysical 
experiments. In this analysis, he argues that finding such correlations between the ‘outer’ and the 
‘inner’ world is of dubious value when it comes to clarifying how nervous systems causally 
function in organizing behavior. In addition, he stresses the need to maintain the representational 
sense of the coding metaphor, for example “as a form of normativity realized by anticipatory 
properties of internal processes.” In this response, I will argue that the issues related to the causal 
operation of the brain are much more general and pervasive than Brette acknowledges here and 
that, as a consequence, his commitment to representations becomes problematical.  
 This wider range of problems becomes visible by highlighting another metaphor, ‘the 
brain’, a concept widely used – including by Brette – to designate the target of neuroscience. 
‘The brain’ may seem a neutral, descriptive term, but just like ‘neural code’ this concept comes 
with a range of ready-made assumptions, associations and theoretical commitments that deserve 
scrutiny.  
 First, ‘the brain’ refers only to the central, and not the peripheral, nervous system; second, 
‘the’ suggests a human brain instead of central nervous systems more generally; and third, ‘the 
brain’ usually refers to nervous systems as a mental or cognitive control system that consists of 
an inner information-processing device, linked to the outer world via its sensors and effectors 
acting as input-output devices. Overall, the phrase ‘the brain’ is associated with interpreting 
nervous systems in relation to humans, to mind and to agency. 
 Using ‘the brain’ to designate the domain of neuroscience is widespread, but it is actually 
quite strange. It restricts neuroscience to a single (or a few) animal species and comes with a 
specific and limited focus on what nervous systems might do. It is a bit like developing an 
account of computation based on a particular computer game. Instead of a human- or mind-
oriented view on neuroscience, we require a neuroscience view on neuroscience. I will discuss 
several issues where the difference plays a role. 
Large parts of (cognitive) neuroscience still rely on a clear conceptual separation between 
neurons and other bodily cells, but this brain-body dualism is becoming increasingly problematic. 
For example, many of the molecular ingredients of neurons go back to unicellular ancestors 
(Sebé-Pedrós, Degnan & Ruiz-Trillo, 2017); the evolutionary differentiation of neurons from 
other cells involved a gradual functional segregation (Arendt, 2008); and non-neural cells are still 
involved in electrical signaling, for example in development (Levin & Martyniuk, 2018). Brains 
are clearly specialized parts of the animal body rather than something of a completely different 
order. 
It is therefore better to talk about ‘nervous systems’ (plural), a phrase that easily 
accommodates the millions of different types of nervous system organization in existence and 
refers to whole systems instead of only the central parts. It also applies to relatively ‘simple’ 
nervous systems that enable fine-grained studies how relatively small collections of neurons can 
accomplish sophisticated behavior (e.g. Marder, 2012; Bargmann & Marder, 2013; Liu, Yang, 
Wu, Duan, Soucy, Jin & Zhang, 2018).  
Focusing on nervous systems more generally provides a different context for 
neuroscience, which is more concrete than the abstract tasks devised to address behavioral and 
cognitive questions. Nervous systems are intrinsically active systems that integrate and balance 
behavioral and perceptual, as well as physiological and developmental processes (Jékely, 
Godfrey-Smith & Keijzer, 2015). To understand how nervous systems actually work, a more 
inclusive view of the various functions of nervous systems is required.  
A general neuroscience perspective also takes the peripheral nervous system as an integral 
part of nervous system functioning. This provides a corrective for the inner-outer dichotomy that 
looks plausible in a mental context as well as for visual and acoustic input. However, the 
dichotomy dissolves when it comes to touch and its dependence on self-initiated activity, 
peripheral nerves, proprioceptive feedback, and the biomechanics of the body itself (Chiel & 
Beer, 1997; Tytell, Holems & Cohen, 2011; Turvey & Fonseca, 2014). The point can also be 
made conceptually: the inner-outer dichotomy fits the philosophical notion of mind, but nervous 
systems are not minds and instead perfectly coextensive with the world, just like the bodies they 
innervate and the interactions with the world they enable. We do not need to interpret nervous 
systems as if they are material minds. 
To reinforce the last point, it helps to look at recent work on the evolution of the first 
nervous systems (Kristan Jr, 2016). We usually take our own macroscopic view of a world full of 
trees and animals as basic. From an evolutionary perspective, it is not. Accessing the world at a 
macroscopic level is a complex achievement that only came about when certain unicellular 
organisms turned into animals with their nervous systems and complex senses like touch and eyes 
(Keijzer, 2015). Intriguingly, in this context the intuitive idea that nervous systems are at heart 
input-output devices must be questioned as nervous systems may – at least initially – have acted 
mostly as internal coordination devices by providing multicellular muscle control (Keijzer, Van 
Duijn & Lyon, 2013; Keijzer & Arnellos, 2017) rather than responding to external stimuli.  
 To conclude, Brette’s critique of the coding metaphor as used in neuroscience is spot on 
and he makes this problem visible in a specific and careful way. However, outside the research 
field discussed by Brette, many other considerations detract from the idea of neural coding. This 
wider context furthermore suggests that neuroscience needs ideas that take in, but go beyond 
viewing the brain as a dynamical system and stressing the centrality of perception-action loops. 
Similarly, hanging on to representational theorizing is not an obvious way to deal with the many 
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